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I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of employers are focusing their primary 
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concerns on security and safety in the workplace due to the events 
of September 11, 2001.  Both employees and managers are
increasingly willing to sacrifice accustomed niceties for this
enhanced protection.1  Since September 11, sales of Internet and e-
mail monitoring software have risen dramatically.  Many employers,
who did not do so in the past, now require employees to carry 
identification badges.  Fire and evacuation drills are conducted 
more frequently.  Employers are focusing on learning as much 
information about employees as possible in the name of safety. 
These new concerns, while warranted by the events of September 
11, raise many issues under applicable employment laws.
The influx in the need for information begs the question: how 
much is too much before the employer’s need for security infringes 
on the employee’s privacy?  Employee monitoring has positive and 
negative consequences.  Although monitoring can lead to greater 
efficiency and better quality control, and possibly decrease the 
employer’s liability for employee misconduct, it can trigger
employee backlash and decrease morale.  Further, it may lead to 
union organizing.2  This article explores emerging questions
relating to the needs of employers and employees by examining the 
current and future state of privacy in the private workplace.
II. HOW FAR CAN AN EMPLOYER GO TO VERIFY CONDUCT AT WORK?
Employee monitoring is not a new concept.  Employers have 
always monitored their employees for reasons of efficiency,
security, or legal obligation.3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,4 as amended, as well as a myriad of other state and federal 
laws, impose an obligation on employers to monitor the workplace 
to ensure the workplace is harassment-free.  An employer’s
communication systems are generally considered part of the
workplace since employees use them during working time on 
working premises.
Improved technology enables employers to dramatically
increase the extent and ability to monitor employee activities.  As 
1. Security is not solely limited to physical safety but also includes
safeguarding employees’ private information.  An employer’s security interest is in 
the protection of its proprietary information as well as the privacy of its employees.
2. John B. Lewis, I Know What You E-Mailed Last Summer, SECURITY MGMT, Jan. 
2002, at 93.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -3 (2002).
4. Id. § 2000e.
2
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businesses rely more and more on electronic mail (“e-mail”) and 
other electronic communications, such as voicemail and mobile 
phones, employers have many new outlets to monitor employees.5
A 2001 report by the Privacy Foundation6 stated that fourteen 
million employees, just over one-third of the online workforce in 
this country, had their e-mail or Internet usage continuously
monitored at work.7  This increase has raised questions as to how 
far employers can go to check employee communications.
A. What are the Privacy Rights of the Private Employee? Employer?
The United States Constitution has been interpreted to
protect privacy rights, but has not been applied to the private 
workplace.  A right to privacy, although not provided for in the 
explicit language of the Constitution, has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to fall under the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth 
Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures and 
applies to federal, state and local government employees, where 
employers conducted the searches.8  The Supreme Court, in 
O’Connor v. Ortega, held that in an invasion of privacy suit, the 
public sector employee’s privacy interest must be balanced against 
the “realities of the workplace.”9  However, absent state action, 
employees of private companies do not receive the Fourth
5. Businesses are not alone in their use and reliance on e-mail.  E-mail and 
its facility to communicate have penetrated the judicial system.  The Ninth Circuit 
recently held that a lawsuit was properly served when it was sent via e-mail.  See Rio 
Prop. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).
6. The Privacy Foundation is a privacy interest group.  For more information 
on the foundation see its website at http://www.privacyfoundation.org.
7. ARTHUR SCHULMAN, THE EXTENT OF SYSTEMATIC MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE
E-MAIL AND INTERNET USE, PRIVACY FOUNDATION REPORT, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/privacywatch/report.asp?id=72&action=0 (July 
9, 2001).
8. Not all agree that the extent of coverage of the Fourth Amendment stops 
at the public sphere.  Judge James M. Rosenbaum, the Chief Judge of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota has expressed that the Fourth
Amendment “embodies a higher principle,” that “an individual retains a certain 
sphere of privacy that is inviolate.”  Megan Santosus, Hard Drives Raise Hard Issues, 
DARWIN, Jan. 2002, at 18, at
http://www.darwinmag.com/read/010102/buzz_privacy.html (quoting James M. 
Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREENBAG 169, 170 (2001), available at
http://www.greenbag.org/rosenbaum_harddrive.pdf).  Judge Rosenbaum opined 
that the private sector should also be covered by the Fourth Amendment’s “higher 
principle.” Id.
9. 480 U.S. 709, 721 (1987).
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Amendment protection granted to their public counterparts.10
In the private realm, the employer’s interests in, for example, 
safety, liability for employees’ actions, and prevention of theft and 
intellectual property are weighed against the individual’s right to 
privacy.  The lower an employee’s expectation of privacy, the 
greater the likelihood that the employer does not invade the 
privacy of the employee when conducting searches or monitoring.
The trend in workplace privacy before September 11 was shifting 
toward employees’ interests; however, employees have become less 
resistant to monitoring since September 11.  It now seems that an 
employer is best protected if it announces its policies regarding 
employee monitoring and workplace privacy.  If an employer does 
not have a policy in place, the employee may still derive protection 
under common law and federal and state statutes.
B. Common Law Tort Actions
Employers who access their employee’s workplace e-mail
without a clear electronic communication policy may be inviting 
claims under state common law for invasion of privacy.  Most states 
have a common law tort claim for privacy, but not all states
recognize all types of claims.  There are four common law theories 
to bring a claim for invasion of privacy: (1) “intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another,” (2) “appropriation of the other’s name or 
likeness,” (3) public disclosure of “private life” facts, and (4) 
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light.”11  As a 
general matter, an employer can avoid liability under the first three 
theories if it does not disclose the information reaped from the 
monitoring of its employees, and does not continue listening in 
when the conversation turns personal.
In New York, for example, courts have declined to recognize a 
common law right of privacy.12  The New York Court of Appeals 
stated, “[w]e have in the past recognized that, in this State, there is 
no common law right of privacy and the only available remedy is 
that created by Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.”13  In its place, some 
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that
individuals are protected against unauthorized interception of their telephone 
communications by the government).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
12. Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating “[n]o 
so-called common law right of privacy exists in New York”).
13. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985).  Civil Rights 
4
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employees turn to the tort theory of defamation to bring claims 
against employers.14  However, this theory is concerned with
publication rather than with the monitoring or recording of
telephone or electronic communication.
With the exception of New York, the most prevalent privacy 
theory an employee invokes when their e-mail or voicemail was 
monitored is intrusion upon seclusion.15  When deciding an
intrusion upon seclusion claim, courts will consider: (1) whether 
the intrusion was intentional, (2) whether the act in question
would have been highly offensive to the average reasonable person, 
(3) whether the plaintiff’s activity was subjectively and objectively
private, and (4) whether the intruder had a legitimate purpose 
justifying the invasion.16  The courts, interested in protecting
employers’ ability to conduct their business, have set a “highly 
offensive standard,” a high bar for employees to meet.
In McLaren v. Microsoft, the Texas Court of Appeals held that 
the employer’s “breaking into” personal folders maintained on the 
employee’s office computer which were protected by a password, 
did not amount to a “highly offensive” invasion of privacy.17  The 
court further held that the employee’s use of a personal password 
did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy, which would 
prohibit the employer from reviewing the message as part of an 
investigation into workplace harassment.18
Employees may also seek redress under a claim for wrongful 
Law § 50 protects an employee’s right to privacy if the employer uses for 
advertising purposes or for trade, the “name, portrait, or picture of any living 
person without having first obtained written consent of such person.”  N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS L. § 50 (2002).  Civil Rights Law § 51 states that the violation of § 50 is a 
misdemeanor and further grants the employee a cause of action for injunction 
and damages.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. § 51 (2002).
14. An employee may bring a claim of defamation if the employer has, 
without an applicable privilege, communicated something false and defamatory 
about the employee.  If the statement communicated is true, the employer has an 
absolute defense to defamation claims, but may be held accountable on other 
invasion of privacy based claims. See Lewis, supra note 2 (citing Lian v. Sedgwick 
James, 992 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (providing more information on claims of 
defamation, emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress)); 
see also Sarah DiLuzio, Workplace E-Mail: It’s Not as Private as You Might Think, 25 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 741, 750 (2000).
15. See Amanda Richman, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee
Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1352 (2001); see also Lewis, supra note 2, at 93.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
17. No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *5 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999).
18. Id. at *12-*13.
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termination under tort law.  In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,19 an at-will
employee claimed he was wrongfully discharged.  The employee 
allegedly sent inappropriate e-mails to his supervisors over the 
company’s e-mail system.20  The employee argued that the
employer’s interception of these e-mails was an invasion of his 
privacy since the employer repeatedly told its employees that the 
communications over the e-mail system would be confidential.21
The court concluded that there was no privacy interest implicated 
in the employee’s message to his supervisor and that the
employer’s interest in maintaining professional and appropriate e-
mail protocols outweighed the employee’s privacy interest.22  The 
court also noted that to establish a violation of public policy, the 
employee must show that the employer’s actions were a “substantial 
and highly offensive invasion of” the employee’s privacy.23
However, in Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc.,24 the court, in 
partially denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment, 
reached a different conclusion.  In that case, the employer did not
have in place a policy regarding use of its e-mail system for personal 
use, but did prohibit “excessive chatting.”25  Moreover, the
plaintiffs, as employees, were not specifically informed that their 
supervisors had access to computer files and e-mail messages, and 
that this information was automatically saved on backup files which 
the supervisors could access.  The plaintiffs’ supervisor read their e-
mail files after hearing that the employees were spending a large 
amount of time on the e-mail.  Among these e-mails were personal 
correspondence and messages sent back and forth between the two 
employees regarding one of the plaintiffs’ extra-marital affairs with 
another employee.26  The employees were discharged.  The
employer claimed that they were dismissed for excessive use of e-
mail and not for its content.  The employees brought claims for 
wrongful termination, invasion of privacy, unlawful interception of 
wire communications, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, loss of consortium and interference with
19. 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
20. Id. at 98-99.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id.  In Smyth, the court held that a reasonable person would not find that 
the employer’s actions met this standard. Id. at 101.
24. No. CA 95-2125, 1996 WL 1329386, at *1 (Mass. Supp. Aug. 13, 1996).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *3.
6
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contractual relations.27  The court granted summary judgment for 
the employer on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
tortious interference with contract claims, but denied summary 
judgment on the employees’ wrongful termination claim.  The 
court held that there was still a genuine issue of material fact on 
the issue of “whether [the employees] had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages and whether [the 
employer’s] reading of the e-mail messages constituted an
unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with plaintiff’s 
privacy.”28
C. Federal Statutes and Judicial Interpretation
Common law tort actions only grant private sector employees 
and employers one mode of protection.  The groundwork for 
electronic privacy law comes from federal statutes.  There are a 
variety of federal statutes that apply to workplace monitoring and 
protection of privacy in the private sector with the purpose of 
curbing employers’ powers to delve into employee
communications.  Nevertheless, most courts are sensitive to
employers when interpreting the statutes and find that there is not 
enough of an employee privacy interest to warrant protection when 
balanced against the employer’s business interests.  Relevant
statutes include the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968,29 the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 
1986 (“ECPA”)30 and the Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications and Transactional Records Access.31  Although 
not specifically targeting workplace monitoring, these Acts have 
been applied to this area.32  The Uniting and Strengthening 
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
32. Besides these existing Acts, legislation has been proposed to focus more 
narrowly on the issue of workplace monitoring.  In July of 2000, the Notice of 
Electronic Monitoring Act (“NEMA”) was introduced in the House and the 
Senate.  Nathan Watson, The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” Enough?, 54 IND. FED. COMM. L. J. 79, 80 (2001).  The 
Act mandated employers to notify their employees before conducting surveillance 
of their employees’ communications. Id. This notification was to include the type 
7
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America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known by its acronym 
the “USA PATRIOT Act,”33 may also have an effect on the private 
sector workplace.
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,34 known as the “Federal Wiretapping Act,” provides for a civil 
cause of action against those who intercept wire, oral or electronic 
communication without the consent of a party.35  A party’s consent
can be expressed or implied,36 however, and the statute excludes 
interceptions by employers in the ordinary course of business.37
The Act also provides for the recovery of compensatory and 
punitive damages as well as attorneys’ fees.38
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)39
amended the Omnibus Crime Control Act. 40  Although noted for 
its lack of clarity, 41 the Act lays out certain prohibitions and 
guidelines.  Title I of the ECPA, like its predecessor, prohibits an 
employer from intentionally intercepting its employees’ wire, oral 
or electronic communications.42  Title II of the ECPA prohibits 
unauthorized “access” to stored communications.43  The Acts
provide an additional exception for the use of “telephone
extensions or monitoring equipment, supplied as part of the 
of monitoring to take place, the kind of communication to be monitored, the type 
of information sought and obtained, the intended use of the information
gathered, and the frequency that monitoring would be conducted. Id. However,
NEMA was not passed and it seems that with the current state of affairs and 
attitudes, a similar bill will not be proposed for some time.  For more information 
on NEMA, see id. at 79 (discussing NEMA and arguing why the proposed
legislation should be reintroduced).
33. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000).
35. Id. § 2520(a).
36. For example, consent may be implied where a party knows that telephone 
calls will be intercepted.  Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000).
38. Id. §§ 2520(b)(1), (2) (2000).
39. Id. § 2510 (2000).
40. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3555.
41. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 
1994) (stating that the Wiretap Act “is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of 
clarity”)).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).  The ECPA amended the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to prevent against unlawful
interception of electronic communications. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
8
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original communications system that are used in the ordinary 
course of business.”44
In sum, there are three pertinent exceptions under the
“Federal Wiretapping Acts.”45  The first exception is for e-mail
service providers, the “provider exception.”  The provider
exception authorizes access to those providing wire or electronic 
communications services.46  Hence, if a company provides
employees with e-mail use from a company-owned system it should 
be covered by this exception.  The second exception is for access 
accomplished in the “ordinary course of business.”47 Under this 
exception, if an employer can justify the monitoring of its
employees’ communications with a business purpose, it should not 
be liable under the Act.  The last exception is the consent 
exception.48  Consent from one party is all that is needed, but it 
must be explicit.  Some courts choose not to infer consent, but will 
find consent when it is apparent.49  Thus, under this third
exception, employers may escape liability under the Act by giving 
clear notice to employees of an employee monitoring policy.
44. Id.  § 2510(5)(a) (2000).
45. For more analysis, see DiLuzio, supra note 14.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
47. The ordinary course of business exception for telephones is set forth in § 
2510(5)(a) of the ECPA:
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or 
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic 
communication other than –
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or 
any component thereof,
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business 
and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its 
business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the 
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its
business; . . . .
Id. § 2510(5)(a).
48. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
49. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
implied consent could not be found since the employer did not inform the 
employee that it was definitely monitoring the phone but only said that it might 
monitor in an effort to “cut down on personal calls”).
9
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1. Application of Federal Statutes to Reviewing E-mail, Voicemail
and the Internet
As noted above, the ECPA regulates the monitoring of
electronic communications, including e-mail and voicemail. The
statute includes several exceptions (as noted above).  Court
decisions involving monitoring employee e-mail have balanced the 
employer’s legitimate business needs against the employee’s privacy 
expectation.50 Under the exception to the ECPA, it appears that 
the employer can escape liability under the Act if the employee 
continues to use the e-mail system after being given adequate 
notice of an employee monitoring policy.
Courts, including New York state courts,51 have held that the
ECPA applies when the e-mail is intercepted at the point of 
transmission.52  The Wiretap Acts thus “provide protection for 
communication only while it is in the course of transmission.  The 
strong expectation of privacy with respect to communication in the
50. See Smith v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding 
that “the company’s interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional
comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy 
interest the employee may have in those comments”).
51. See, e.g., Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 283 A.D.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001) (reinstating the plaintiff’s cause of action alleging that his employer 
learned about his affair by intercepting his e-mail, because “although the statute 
prohibits only intercepts that are contemporaneous with transmission, i.e., the 
intercepted communication must be in transit, not in storage, an allegation that 
there was an intercept is sufficient for pleading purposes”) (citation omitted).
52. See Eagle Inv. Sys. Corp. v. Einar Tamm, 146 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D. 
Mass. 2001) (holding that the ECPA did not eliminate the “during-transmission
requirement” from the Wiretap Act and noting that if Congress had intended the 
definition of “electronic communication” to include both transfer and storage, it 
easily could have included the word “storage” in the definition); Steve Jackson 
Games Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that “Congress’ use of the word ‘transfer’ in the definition of ‘electronic 
communication’ and its omission in that definition of the phrase ‘any electronic 
storage of such communication’ (part of the definition of ‘wire communication’)”
reflects that Congress did not intend for “intercept” to apply to communications
in “electronic storage”).  However, in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 
1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001), the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s limitation to in “transit” e-mails.  The 
court stated, “[a]n electronic communication in storage is no more or less private 
than an electronic communication in transmission.  Distinguishing between the 
two for purposes of protection from interception is ‘irrational’ and ‘an
insupportable result given Congress’ emphasis of individual privacy rights during 
passage of the ECPA.’” Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).  Nevertheless, the court 
withdrew its opinion and changed its mind in holding that interception must be 
done during “transmissions,” and “not while it is in electronic storage.”  Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002).
10
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course of transmission significantly diminishes once transmission is 
complete.”53  Thus, these Acts do not expressly prohibit employers 
from retrieving stored e-mail and recording video without audio.54
In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,55 the court analyzed the 
workings of e-mail and held that review of an employee’s e-mail
from a file server may be “ethically ‘questionable’” but “not legally 
actionable under” federal statutes.56
However, federal protection still exists for employees
regarding the distribution of information gathered from storage 
and file servers.  Once the employer has accessed recorded
messages, the law limits their disclosure and prohibits certain
unauthorized disclosures.  However, the employer may disclose a 
message to an addressee, an intended recipient, or to an agent of 
that person.  The employer may also disclose the contents of stored 
messages with the lawful consent of the originator, addressee, or 
intended recipient.
The USA PATRIOT Act57 gives law enforcement more power to 
facilitate the investigation of suspected terrorists.  It is unclear how 
this will affect private sector employment.  It is expected that the 
Act will further curtail the private rights of private sector employees 
because it gives the government increased power to surreptitiously 
obtain information.  The Act makes it easier for the government to 
check individual’s voicemail and e-mail.  Whereas before the USA 
PATRIOT Act the government needed a wiretap warrant that was 
often difficult to obtain, now a simple search warrant may do.58
53. Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Ins., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637-38 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (holding that the employer did not violate the ECPA by accessing stored e-
mail on its system after the e-mail was received by the named recipients).
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 
(2002), stated in dicta that since Congress amended the Wiretap Act, see USA 
PATRIOT Act §209, 115 Stat. at 283,  “to eliminate storage from the definition of 
wire communication,” that once transmission is complete there is no longer an 
issue for protection. Id. at 879.
54. In an analogous criminal case, United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
324, 329  (E.D. Va. 1998), the court found that there was no violation of the ECPA 
since the e-mail in question was copied from storage and not while it was being 
transferred.  In Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 501-
06 (D. Kan. 1996), the court held that the employer had not violated the ECPA 
when it installed a video only surveillance camera in the school’s security
personnel changing room after reported thefts had transpired.
55. 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
56. Id. at 637-38.
57. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
58. See USA PATRIOT Act § 213 (providing for delays of notice of warrants).
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The Act allows companies to alert and involve government agencies 
if an employee is using electronic communications for
“unauthorized use.”59  The government, and possibly employers 
who comply with proper government requests under the Act, can 
bypass some security safeguards to view a myriad of personal
information about employees.  Thus, with a new interest in
detecting threats not only to the company in question but also to 
the general public, employers may have even more flexibility in 
reviewing office communications.  As Attorney General John
Ashcroft heralded, “prevention is predicated on information.”60
Much public sentiment supports the Attorney General, and many 
welcome increased security in exchange for the loss of some aspects 
of privacy.61  Further, Congress is contemplating giving employers 
in some industries access to FBI databases of arrests, convictions 
and other suspect lists.62
In addition to concerns regarding office e-mail and voicemail, 
employers are concerned about employee abuse of the Internet.
Inappropriate use of the Internet is an important issue for many 
companies.  In certain circumstances, if employees misuse the 
Internet, employers may be found liable.  Moreover, misuse of the 
Internet may create a hostile work environment, divert the
attention of a company’s workforce, and diminish productivity and 
morale.  Misuse by employees of the “Web” has caused a surge in 
the field of employee Internet management (“EIM”).  At a recent 
conference, one research firm estimated that the market for EIM 
will approach $750 million by the year 2005.63  Use of the Internet 
in the workplace also raises issues regarding employee privacy 
rights.64  Most of the concerns about privacy and the Internet focus 
59. Id. §§ 210, 212 (expanding government access to records which can be 
sought without a court order); see also James Heaphey, Privacy Not Priority where 
Workplace Security is Concerned, DAILY PRESS, Nov. 19, 2001, at C6.
60. Ann Davis, How September 11 Changed America: Are We Safer Now Than Before 
Terror Attacks, MSNBC, available at
http://www.msnbc.comm/news/721031.asp?pne=msn (March 8, 2002).
61. However, many do not agree with the Attorney General.  Some privacy 
advocates argue that increased security measures and methods directly infringe 
upon citizens’ civil liberties.  See ACLU, at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/privacymain.cfm; see also Privacy Foundation, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org.
62. Davis, supra note 60.
63. Emerging Web Content and Employee Internet Misuse Continue to Drive Market 
for EIM Software, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 20, 2002 at 1.
64. For more information regarding the Internet and privacy rights, see
Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
12
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on the use of data collection and information stored or used 
without an individual’s consent.65  This concern is not limited to 
the workplace but is at the forefront of litigation on this matter.66
In In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, the court held that 
the use of “cookies”67 to access communications between an
Internet user and Web sites visited while on-line did not violate the 
ECPA or the Wiretap Act.68  The class action was filed by users of 
the World Wide Web, alleging that DoubleClick and its affiliated 
web sites collected personal information (names, e-mail addresses, 
telephone numbers, home and business addresses, previous web 
sites visited and previous searches on Internet), which users would 
not ordinarily expect advertisers to be able to collect without 
authorized access, in violation of several federal privacy acts.69  The 
court held that DoubleClick’s actions fell under an exception to 
the ECPA70 or outside of the statute’s purview since Defendant 
288 (2001) (discussing anonymity and the Internet); see also Rachel K.
Zimmerman, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 439 (2000-2001); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy; Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control,
and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 (2000).
65. For a striking view into just how much information can be gathered about 
a user when surfing the Internet, visit http://www.privacy.net.
66. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 
597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Internet user who downloaded supplier’s
software from website maintained by an unrelated site operator did not assent to 
licensing agreement not mentioned on unrelated site); see also Supnick v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. C00-0221P, 2000 WL 1603820, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 
2000) (allowing for class action suit against software users for software that enables
them to intercept and access Internet users’ personal information).
67. “Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web sites to store 
useful information such as usernames, passwords, and preferences, making it 
easier for users to access Web pages in an efficient manner.” In re Doubleclick, 
Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
68. Id. at 514, 519 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(c)(2), 2511(2)(d) (1994)).
69. 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503.  Defendant was able to reap this personal
information by using “cookies” placed or already in existence on Plaintiffs’
computers. Id.
70. The statute states that it is not an offense to intentionally access without 
authorization, a facility through which an electronic information service is
provided or to intentionally exceed an authorization to access that facility, and
thereby obtain access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in a system if the conduct is authorized “by a user of that [wire 
or electronic communication] service with respect to a communication of or 
intended for that user.” Id. at 507 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 (a), (c) (1994)).
Congress subsequently the statute amended by the USA PATRIOT Act §209, 115 
Stat. at 283, and eliminated storage from the definition of wire communication.
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provided the service and the users freely used its service.71  Further,
the court held that Defendant’s actions did not violate the Wiretap 
Act because they fell under the consent exception: the Plaintiffs 
freely used Defendant’s service, Defendant’s affiliates consented to 
the use of this information and Plaintiffs could not show that the 
Defendant’s acts were done for criminal or tortious purposes.72
2. Application of Federal Statutes to Telephone and Cellular 
Phone Surveillance
Employers who have traditionally relied on supervisors to
monitor employee performance are increasingly using technology, 
such as telephone monitoring, to track employee workplace
operations and communications.  In some industries, such as
catalogue sales and telemarketing, listening to an employee’s
telephone conversations enables the employer to accurately assess 
the employee’s contact with clients and the public.  In these 
industries, employees understand that they may be monitored.
However, in other industries an unstated presumption of employee 
privacy exists.  Many employers, especially following September 11, 
surreptitiously monitor telephone calls under the “ordinary course 
of business” exception to the Federal Wiretapping Act.73  A general 
policy authorizing monitoring does not necessarily establish that 
the monitoring of any particular call occurred in the ordinary 
course of business.  Nor does “the fact that the technology is not 
eavesdrop-proof . . . in itself defeat any expectation of privacy.”74
Rather, each particular monitoring activity must be considered 
separately to determine whether it occurred in the ordinary course 
of business.
For example, in Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm Services, Inc.,75 the 
court analyzed whether a central station alarm services company 
71. 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513-14.
72. Id. at 519.
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . electronic communication 
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of 
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such 
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose 
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or any State.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
73. See supra note 47.
74. Syposs v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 224, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
75. 182 F.R.D 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d 202 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2000).
14
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illegally eavesdropped on employees’ private telephone
conversations.  The court stated that the employer could avail itself 
of the ordinary course of its business exception.
Here, the defendants’ actions in recording—as
distinguished from listening to—the telephone traffic into 
and out of their premises was amply justified by their
legitimate interests in timely provision of emergency
services, ensuring employee fidelity and protecting
themselves against unfounded claims.  Given the fact that 
alarm signals may be received at any time of the day or 
night, those interests could be served adequately only by 
the constant recording that was done.  Accordingly, this 
Court holds that the interceptions—assuming the
interceptions consisted of the recording—were made in 
the ordinary course of defendants’ business.76
Further, in Briggs v. American Air Filter Co.,77 the ordinary course 
of business exception applied where a supervisor reasonably
suspected that an employee was disclosing confidential information 
to a competitor and had warned the employee of his suspicions.
The court held that the supervisor acted in the ordinary course of 
business by listening in while the parties discussed business
matters.78
The exception also applied in Epps v. St. Mary’s Hospital.79 An
employer overheard a phone conversation in which an employee 
berated supervisors.  The employer turned on a taping system to 
record the remainder of the conversation.  The court held the 
exception applied because the conversation occurred during office 
hours, between co-employees, and concerned scurrilous remarks 
about supervisors.80  The court stated, “[c]ertainly the potential
contamination of a working environment is a matter in which the 
employer has a legal interest.”81
Likewise, in Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, the employer 
monitored calls made by its customer service representatives in 
order to supervise employee training and service.82  Although the 
court found the employer had a legitimate purpose to monitor 
76. 182 F.R.D. at 417.
77. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. Id. at 420.
79. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 417.
81. Id.
82. Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1373 (D. Kan. 
1996).
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telephone calls, the court only recognized the legitimate purpose 
of monitoring business calls, not all calls.83
Case law also reflects the exception’s limitations.    Notably, in 
Deal v. Spears, the exception did not protect a liquor storeowner 
who suspected that a recent burglary of the store was an “inside 
job” involving one of his employees.84  The employer installed a 
device to surreptitiously record all calls made or received at the 
store.  The plaintiff employee, who was married, was having an 
affair with a second plaintiff, who also was married.  The employer 
recorded about twenty-two hours of calls, many of which included 
sexually provocative conversations.  The employer was unable to 
implicate the plaintiff in the burglary but did learn she sold her 
lover a keg of beer at cost, for which she was terminated.  The 
employer argued that the monitoring came within the exception.
The court disagreed and found the employer had violated the 
Federal Wiretapping Act by using the recording device.85
Similarly, in Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp.,86 the court held that 
the exception could not protect an employer when it attached a 
“voice logger” to record all phone calls.  A security guard employed 
by a subcontractor of the company claimed the taping violated the 
Federal Wiretapping Act.  The court held the taping was not 
protected by the exception because the logger was not “a
telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,” and 
there was no business justification for “the drastic measure of 
24-hour a day, 7-day a week recording of telephone calls.”87
Business calls generally fall under the exception to the federal 
wiretapping acts.88  However, if the employer does not inform the 
employee that personal calls will be monitored, those calls may not 
be covered. The Eleventh Circuit has held that when an employer 
realizes that a call is personal and not business related, the
employer must discontinue the monitoring of the call.89  However, 
when an employee has been informed to abstain from making 
personal calls, the employee may then assume the risk that his calls 
83. Id. at 1380.
84. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 1155-58.
86. 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994).
87. Id. at 741.
88. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581-83 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the employee had only consented to monitoring of business sales 
calls and not personal calls).
89. Id.
16
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may be monitored.90
Originally, courts held that cellular telephone users had “no 
expectation of privacy in their conversations.”91  However, when the 
ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act, cell phones were
included in its web of protection.  In the wake of this amendment, 
courts have changed their perception on cell phones, holding that 
people reasonably expect privacy in their cellular phone
conversations.92
More recently, courts have continued to apply this rationale.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,93 the Third Circuit analyzed the federal 
statutes described in the preceding section and deciphered
whether the press was liable for broadcasting a cell phone
conversation between a teacher’s union president and the union’s 
chief negotiator when the conversation had been intercepted by an 
unknown person.  The court found that those who had unlawfully 
intercepted the conversation violated Title III of the Federal
Wiretapping Act.94
These federal acts do not preempt state statutes.  Individual 
state statutes may also apply to private sector employees’ privacy 
interests.
D. State Statutes
State legislatures may craft legislation that goes beyond that of 
the federal statutes.  State laws vary; for example, some mandate 
that all parties must consent before monitoring can take place.
In New York, the statutory grants of the right to privacy to
private sector employees are very limited.  Under the New York 
wiretapping statute, the only clear exception applicable is express 
or implied consent.95  Certain other statutes eliminate specified 
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1989).
92. See, e.g., Dunlap v. County of Inyo., 121 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Kim, 803 F. Supp. 352, 362 (D. Haw. 1992).  However, this perception 
does not necessarily apply for criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 177 
F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that FBI wiretaps of defendant’s
cellular phone were properly conducted).
93. 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 125-29.  However, the case rose to the Supreme Court, which went 
on to assume that the interceptor violated Title III of the Act and held that a 
stranger’s illegal conduct does not remove the First Amendment protections for 
the press.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
95. N.Y. PENAL L. § 250.25(1) (1999). See also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. §§ 50-51,
supra note 13.
17
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methods of observation.  For example, the General Business Law
precludes surveillance equipment from being installed in specific 
areas of business (i.e. bathrooms, fitting rooms, etc.).96  New York 
Penal Law prohibits wiretapping.97
Twenty-eight states have passed laws analogous to the ECPA.98
For example, Connecticut law requires that employers who wish to 
monitor employees’ communications provide written notice of the 
types of monitoring that they might perform.99  Prior written notice 
is not required, however, when an employer has reasonable
grounds to believe an employee is engaged in conduct that creates 
a hostile work environment, violates the law, or infringes on the 
legal rights of the employer or other employees.100  Illinois’ statute 
is limited to audible expressions and thus e-mail may not be 
included.101  A Maryland statute covers mail surveillance but
requires that the communication be intercepted.102  Furthermore, 
Maryland law requires prior consent of all parties to the
communication.103  In California, vetoed legislation would have 
mandated that an employee receive notice of a policy before an 
employer could view the employee’s personal e-mail and computer 
records.104  California does extend constitutional privacy protection
to private citizens, however.105  West Virginia enacted a statute in 
1999 that bars employers from using any form of electronic
surveillance in areas designed for “the health or personal comfort 
of the employees or for safeguarding of their possessions, such as 
96. N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. §395-b (McKinney 2002).
97. N.Y. PENAL L. §§ 250.05, 250.25.  However, these statutes are not
interpreted to grant a private right of action for their violation.  2 JONATHAN L.
SULDS, NEW YORK EMPLOYMENT LAW, ch. 18-5 (2d ed. 2001) (citations omitted).
98. The states that have passed analogous legislation are:  California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(3)(b)(1) (2001).
100. Id.  § 31-48d(3)(b)(2).
101. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(d) (1993).
102. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (2002).
103. See State v. McGhee, 447 A.2d  888, 891 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
104. See S. 1016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
105. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.  The California Court of Appeals, in TBG Ins. Serv. 
Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 163-64 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002), held that when an employee has signed a monitoring policy and was 
given the use of an office and home computer for work use, and has consented to 
an employer’s monitoring policy, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the state’s constitution. Id. at 164.
18
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rest rooms, shower rooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and
employee lounges.”106
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, state legislatures 
may follow the utilitarian path of Congress and, under a veil of 
citizen security, place an entire state’s interest in safety above an 
individual’s right to privacy.
III. WHAT COMPANIES ARE IMPLEMENTING AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND
HOW THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE IS IMPACTED
A. New Safety Inquiries
After September 11, companies are instituting new methods of 
security.  Employers lacking policies regarding office e-mail,
Internet and telephone use are enacting such policies.  As
computer software enabling workplace surveillance drops in price 
and increases in sophistication, more employers are using
electronic means of monitoring.107  These methods affect not only 
the workplace as a whole,108 but also individual employees.
Companies that implemented computer monitoring programs to 
search for trigger words that signal potentially sexually harassing e-
mails have now added to the programs words such as
“bioterrorism” and “anthrax.”109  Additionally, some companies are 
extending background checks to all employees.  While these
methods may create a safer work environment, they must be
carefully analyzed in light of federal and state laws because they 
may affect the employees’ rights to privacy.
The multiple requirements of identification badges, fire alarm 
drills and emergency routes necessitate the need for employers to 
be advised of their employees’ disabilities or impairments.
106. W. VA. CODE § 21-3-20 (2002).
107. Melynda Dovel Wilcox, You’re Being Watched, KIPLINGER’S PERSONAL
FINANCE, Feb. 2002, at 21-22.
108. This article does not directly address the concerns over workplace
environments.  However, the events of September 11 coupled with the
bioterrorism attacks that sent anthrax into American workplaces generate
concerns regarding workplace environment and safety.  Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) rules and regulations, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2002), 
grant employers a general duty to provide employees with a safe workplace.  How
far employers must go to prevent anthrax or other bioterrorism attacks in the 
workplace has not been determined.  Employers should reevaluate their security 
and safety measures to promote a safe workplace under the circumstances.
109. Wilcox, supra note 107, at 21-22.
19
Bloom et al.: Competing Interests in the Post 9-11 Workplace: The New Line betw
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
STEELMAN CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:31 PM
916 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
Normally, employers should avoid asking about an individual’s 
disability or impairment as it relates to his job duties.  The EEOC 
ordinarily issues guidance on topics regarding the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), such as privacy and emergency evacuation 
procedures.110  Since September 11, employers must weigh safety 
concerns against sensitivity towards personal privacy.  Therefore, 
employers are more inclined to ask about impairments in the 
possibility of an emergency and/or evacuation.111  With safety as the 
basis for applying the new requirements, and as long as the level of 
privacy expected is made clear, the consensus among many is that 
employees must abide by the employers’ policies.112  Some feel that 
at a minimum this applies to an employee’s age and ethnicity.
Because age and race are protected categories under the anti-
discrimination laws, amassing a database with this information, 
even if done under the veil of “safety,” may trigger more civil rights 
litigation if followed by adverse employment actions.
Technology has had a monumental effect upon our ability to 
store information.  Personal information, such as that derived from 
background checks, which was once filed or stored in cabinets, can 
now be condensed and easily transferred to a disk or e-mail file or 
stored on a hard drive or network.  Digital storage has also made 
the process of searching cheaper.113  The ease with which
information can now be sought, gathered, and received was at one 
time unfathomable.114
Post-9/11, employers are using the new technology to
determine who exactly is in their workplace.115  Background check 
companies state that there is a great influx in the use of such 
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), (d) (1990).
111. See 16 EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION REPORTER, Dec. 11, 2001, at 10.
112. Carrie Johnson, Life in Cyberspace; Loss of Privacy Could be Price of Security,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 2001, at C02.  One attorney cited in the article stated that if an 
employee can show that the information required on a mandatory identification
badge is “a cover for another kind of information” in a protected category such as 
age or ethnicity, then the employee may be able to make a discrimination claim.
Id.
113. Id.
114. In the past, many databases were not connected.  If an employer based in 
New York wanted to conduct a search of a potential employee’s criminal record,
he would have to search each state and county database.  Now, some companies
have linked databases together to create a more efficient and cost effective search 
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services as they have changed from a luxury to a necessity.116  One 
spokesperson for a background check company stated that in 
October and November 2001, his company had a thirty-three
percent increase in business from employers who were re-
evaluating security.117  Background checks that were once used 
primarily for screening applicant pools are now used to check 
current employees.118  Even with this new surge, the question still 
remains: How far can employers delve into an employee’s
background before intruding upon an employee’s (or potential 
employee’s) right to privacy?
Under amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”),119 employers who use “consumer reports” must meet 
stringent standards for disclosure and consent.  To fall within the 
scope of the FCRA, a report must be prepared by a “consumer 
reporting agency,” a business that is regularly paid to gather and 
report information on consumers for third parties.120  Before an 
employer obtains a report on an existing employee or a job 
applicant, the employer must notify the individual in writing.121
Further, the employer must obtain written authorization from the 
employee or applicant before the background check can take 
place.122  Moreover, specific requirements govern adverse action by 
the employer based on information discovered in the report.123  If 
the employer is going to use the report in his decision not to hire, 
the employer must provide the potential employee with a copy of 
the report accompanied by a statement of the prospective
employee’s rights.124  Employers, however, may not use the
information revealed in the report as a basis for refusal to hire 
unless the nature of the offense would create an “unreasonable 
risk” to property or safety in the work environment.125
Some argue an increase in background checks will not create 
safer work environments.  One commentator opined that
sophisticated criminals will use the technology to stay ahead of 
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Christopher A. Weals, Workplace Privacy, The Tide Has Turned, Opening the 
Door for Employers to Snoop – and More, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 27.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1997).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(a).
122. Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(b).
123. Id. § 1681b(b)(3).
124. Id.
125. See N.Y. CORRECT. L. § 752.
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investigators, and pointed out that the hijackers of the planes 
crashed on September 11 did not buy homes, cars, or apply for 
loans, which would have created a residual electronic trail.126  As 
extensive searches increase and employees assert their privacy
rights, the clash between the competing interests will continue.
B. What is the Best Way to Inform Your Employees of 
Your Company’s Policy?
To reduce the risk of claims, companies may benefit from 
having a clear electronic communication policy.  An employer may 
not provide sufficient notice by simply stating that ownership of 
office property allows the employer unfettered discretion to search 
electronic communications at any time.  A clearly presented policy 
informs employees: (1) that their modes of electronic
communication, such as office computers and phones (including 
cell phones), cannot be misused for unprofessional and/or
inappropriate communications; (2) what constitutes unprofessional 
or inappropriate misuse; (3) that the electronic devices are the 
property of the company; and (4) that employees should not have 
any expectation of privacy in the use of these devices or the 
communications they exchange.  Moreover, the policy should 
inform employees of the possible legal consequences of electronic 
communications.  A policy that encompasses these specifications 
has been highly regarded by the judiciary.127
Employers should consider many different factors when
creating an electronic communication policy.  The policy should 
state who will have access to the information viewed, the purpose of 
the use, those to whom the information may be disclosed, and that 
the information may be stored on a separate computer.
Unauthorized use by employees may be deterred if they also are 
placed on notice of the repercussions of misuse.  This includes a 
warning stating that no employee should use e-mail for
communications containing racial slurs, sexual harassment, or
other inappropriate comments.  Knowing that a supervisor could 
view e-mail correspondence with other employees may deter an 
employee from discussing inappropriate topics.  This would not 
126. Guernsey, supra note 114.
127. See TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 162 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing incentives for, and correct inclusions of, employer
policies on electronic communications).
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only protect the employee, but would also help the employer avoid 
liability for the employee’s acts.  When drafting policies, employers 
should also consider employees’ interests; solely considering the 
employer’s business interests may generate policies that fail to 
address the employee’s privacy concerns.128  In summary, an
employer should conceive of appropriate ways to minimize privacy 
expectations while being sensitive to the potential impact on
employee morale.
These suggestions do not necessarily apply to all employers.
Nevertheless, employers are encouraged to inform employees that 
they are under surveillance at work, and each company should have 
a policy tailored to its needs.  Furthermore, there are a variety of 
ways to notify employees of the company policy.  A key requirement 
is that the employer obtains some form of consent, whether explicit 
or implicit.  While a signature page that affirmatively confirms 
assent to the company’s policy and provides clear evidence of 
consent would be most beneficial, the consent requirement could 
be achieved in numerous other ways.  Other examples include 
mandating employee acknowledgment of receipt of e-mail
messages concerning the company’s policies and notifying
employees via the employee handbook that the company adheres
to a policy by which it reviews employee e-mail.
It is essential that employers take immediate steps to protect 
themselves from potential privacy claims.  Suggested preventive 
measures include establishing a privacy checklist.  Such a checklist 
includes the following:
• Awareness of Current Law: Stay apprised of the most current 
law and its application to your actions;
• Notice: Give applicants and employees notice of intended 
monitoring and the method of the intended monitoring;
• Purpose of Monitoring: Ensure that monitoring is directly 
related to the purposes and functions of the employee’s job;
• Means of Monitoring: Use reasonable and unobtrusive
means to monitor employees when necessary; and
• Confidentiality: Safeguard the confidentiality of private
information obtained about employees.
128. Jeremy U. Blackowicz, E-mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the Private Sector
Workplace, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 80, 101 (2001).  For example, within its
business related interest, an employer may justify reviewing an employee’s
personal e-mail regarding other companies.  The employee’s concern focuses on 
disclosure of proprietary information contained in her e-mail. See id.
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C. Discovery and the Importance of Data Retention
Occasionally, e-mails are problematic for employers embroiled 
in sexual harassment and race discrimination cases.129  Abuses of 
company e-mail by employees can lead to the distribution of 
racially charged130 or sexually harassing e-mails131 to the entire 
company or to a selective group of targeted individuals.  In either 
case, such e-mails could give rise to a claim of discrimination.
Once legal action commences, the discovery process can create 
large obstacles for the employer.  The e-mails in question may have 
been stored on the system and thus subject the employer to grave 
liability if it is forced to disclose the contents of its networks and 
databases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The atmosphere of the workplace post-9/11 has changed 
dramatically.  With the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 
employee privacy rights in the private workplace are declining now 
more than ever.  However, this decline does not indicate that 
employee privacy rights are not of major concern or a hotly
contested issue.  For this reason, employers should establish e-mail
and voicemail policies to protect themselves and ensure efficient 
business practices.  The implementation of policies can aid in 
preventing employer liability on multiple fronts, including liability 
for employees who misuse such communication methods and
invasion of privacy claims.  In the new workplace, the schism 
between privacy and safety may coalesce upon the notion that it is 
better to be safe than sorry.
129. For further analysis on the vast liability that e-mail can create for
employers, see Gregory I. Rasin & Joseph P. Moan, Fitting a Square Peg Into a Round 
Hole: The Application of Traditional Rules of Law to Modern Technological Advancements 
in the Workplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 793, 804-07 (2000).
130. See, e.g., Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 WL 
403454, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997) (granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment while granting plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended complaint 
in a suit by African American employees premised upon, amongst other things, an 
allegedly racist e-mail).
131. See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 856 F. Supp. 821, 821-23 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment in a dispute in 
which a female worker alleged that her supervisor’s sexually charged e-mails were 
offensive).
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